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JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. §78-2-2a(3)(j) (1996).
Garco appeals "the final order of the Honorable William B. Bohling entered in this matter
on May 1, 1998. The appeal is taken from the entire order." [R 521 (App. 25)] That order
disposed of Garco's Motion to Revise Order and Judgment Dismissing Plaintiffs Complaint. [R
452 (App. 14)] This Court has jurisdiction to rule on all arguments raised in Garco's motion.
Garco incorporated all arguments it raised in the parties' cross motions for summary judgment:
Garco incorporates here by reference its November 17, 1997 Memorandum in
Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment ... [R 442 (App. 15)]
This includes the law in Garco's Memoranda on the cross motions for summary
judgment, for brevity's sake incorporated here by reference. [R 443 (App. 15)]
Garco thus raised anew in its Motion to Revise all issues it had raised in the parties' cross motions
for summary judgment. The trial court ruled on those issues when it concluded [R 513 (App. 22)]
"plaintiffs arguments essentially rehash arguments already fully considered." Garco's appeal "from
the entire order" gives this Court appellate jurisdiction to address those arguments.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Standard of Review for AH Issues:
Summary judgment is proper only when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The appellate court accords no deference to
conclusions of law, but reviews them for correctness, and views all facts and inferences in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party. Drysdale v. Ford Motor Co., 947 P.2d 678, 680 (Utah
1997); Utah R. Civ. Proc. 56(c); Krantz v. Holt. 819 P.2d 352, 353 (Utah 1991).

ISSUE ONE: WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ARE SUFFICIENT TO DISMISS GARCO'S
TRESPASS CLAIM ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
Preservation of Issue: R 205-210 (App. 4 p. 11-15); R 390-395 (App. lOp. 10-13-15); R 442-445
(App. 15 p. 2-5); R 468-475 (App. 17 p. 3-10). (App. 15, p. 2-3 incorporated App. 4 and 11.)

ISSUE TWO: WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ARE SUFFICIENT TO DISMISS GARCO'S
UNLAWFUL DETAINER CLAIM ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
Preservation of Issue: R 210-211 (App. 4 p. 15-16); R 396 (App. 10 p. 16); R 475-476 (App.
15 p. 5-6). (App. 15, p. 2-3 incorporated App. 4 and 11.)

ISSUE THREE: WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT, IN DISMISSING
GARCO'S INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE CLAIM, PROPERLY FOUND
THERE WAS NO IMPROPER PURPOSE OR IMPROPER MEANS.
Preservation of Issue: R 211-214 (App. 4 p. 16-19); R 396 (App. 10 p. 16); R 476-477 (App.
15 p. 6-7); R 476-477 (App. 17 p. 11-12). (App. 15, p. 2-3 incorporated App. 4 and 11.)

ISSUE FOUR: WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING
GARCO'S CLAIM FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES.
Preservation of Issue: R 448 (App. 15 p. 8); R 469-471, 473-476 (App. 17 p. 4-6, 8-11).

ISSUE FIVE: WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN STRIKING
PORTIONS OF GARCO'S RULE 54(v) REPLY MEMORANDUM.
standard of Review:

Abuse of discretion; reviewed for correctness. Astill v. Clark, 956

>.2d 1081, 1086 (Utah App. 1598).
'reservation of Issue: R 469-471, 473-476 (App. 17 p. 4-6, 8-11); R498-502 (App. 20).

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES

UTAH CODE ANN. §57-3-103. Each document not recorded as provided in this title is void as
against any subsequent purchaser of the same real property, or any portion of it, if: (1) the
subsequent purchaser purchased the property in good faith and for a valuable consideration; and
(2) the subsequent purchaser's document is first duly recorded.

UTAH CODE ANN. §§78-36-3.
(1) A tenant of real property, for a term less than life, is guilty of an unlawful detainer:
(a) when he continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, of the property or any part of it,
after the expiration of the specified term or period for which it is let to him, which specified term
or period, whether established by express or implied contract, or whether written or parol, shall be
terminated without notice at the expiration of the specified term or period;
(b) when, having leased real property for an indefinite time with monthly or other periodic rent
reserved:
(i) he continues in possession of it in person or by subtenant after the end of any month or
period, in cases where the owner, his designated agent, or any successor in estate of the
owner, 15 days or more prior to the end of that month or period, has served notice requiring
him to quit the premises at the expiration of that month or period: or
(ii) in cases of tenancies at will, where he remains in possession of the premises after the
expiration of a notice of not less than five days ...

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Nature of The Case.
This is an action for trespass, unlawful detainer and intentional interference with prospective

economic relations, arising out of ROA's unlawful possession of Garco's real property, and ROA's
intentional acts to prevent Garco from ever again renting its property to any outdoor advertiser.
Garco challenges rulings of the Honorable William B. Bohling dismissing Garco's Complaint on
summary judgment while ignoring Garco's cross motion for summary judgment; denying Garco's
motion to revise the order dismissing the Complaint; and striking parts of Garco's reply
memorandum in support of its motion to revise the order dismissing the Complaint.
In 1975 ROA and the then property owners apparently entered into an unrecorded sign
location lease on property abutting 1-15. ROA then erected a billboard on the property. In 1990
Garco bought the property, with three buildings containing commercial rental units. The seller gave
Garco a sworn statement all rentals (including Reagan's) were on an unwritten monthly basis, and
(with exceptions not including ROA) there were no written agreements binding on Garco. The
seller also delivered his files, which contained no signed ROA lease. Garco received rental
payments from ROA and other tenants on a month to month rental basis. Garco asked ROA at least
twice regarding rental agreements. ROA failed to disclose the existence of a written lease.
In 1991 Garco informed ROA it had to sign a lease or remove the sign. Beginning about
June of 1992 ROA and Garco began negotiating a lease, which they eventually reduced to writing.
ROA was to "clean up" the draft agreement but failed to do so. In October of 1992 ROA told
Garco if Garco would not sign a different lease, ROA would remove the sign, and erect another sign
within 500 feet of Garco's property lines, so as to keep Garco from doing business with anyone but
ROA. (U.C.A. §27-12-136.5 requires signs in the area to be at least 500 feet apart).

In December of 1992 ROA recorded the 1975 lease, then for the first time claimed Garco
was bound by that document. Garco tried again to negotiate with ROA, but was unable to get ROA
to agree to a lease. In February of 1995 Garco finally told ROA to remove the sign. ROA agreed
to remove the entire structure including the foundation. In April of 1995 ROA secretly leased a new
sign location from Garco's neighbor, Mollerup Moving & Storage. ROA applied to UDOT to move
k

an existing sign permit, but not its permit for the Garco sign, to the Mollerup property. By June
I, 1995 ROA had erected a new sign on the Mollerup property, just under 500 feet from Garco's
south boundary, making it unlawful for Garco to lease either to ROA or to ROA'c competitors. On
July 19, 1995 ROA cut the Garco sign off at ground but left its sign foundation in place. ROA then
moved its Garco sign permit to the Mollerup sign. ROA told Garco it located the Mollerup sign
within 500 feet of Garco's boundary to prevent Garco from doing business with anyone but ROA.
On July 29, 1996, Garco served ROA with a Notice of Unlawful Detainer demanding removal of
the remaining sign structure. ROA still has not removed the sign foundation.

II.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition at Trial Court.

09/10/98

Garco filed its Complaint.

10/2/96

ROA served its Answer.

01/10/97

ROA moved to amend its Answer to plead a Counterclaim. The trial court granted
ROA's motion to amend.

03/24/97

Garco served its Reply to Counterclaim.

08/08/97

ROA served its Motion for Summary Judgment.

08/21/97

Garco served its Memorandum in Opposition.

09/05/97

ROA served its Reply Memorandum.

11/17/97

Garco served its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and requested oral argument.

11/24/97

The trial court heard oral argument on ROA's Motion for Summary Judgment,
admitted it had not read Garco's cross Motion for Partial Summary Judgment or
reviewed Garco's supporting memorandum or affidavits. The trial court ruled from
the bench that the Complaint was dismissed with prejudice.

12/29/97

Still without reading or considering Garco's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment,
the trial court entered its Order and Judgment Dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint.

01/29/98

Garco served its Motion to Revise Order and Judgment Dismissing Plaintiff's
Complaint under Rule 54(b). In addition to new arguments, Garco incorporated in
its memorandum Garco's memoranda on the cross motions for summary judgment.

03/18/98

ROA served its Motion to Strike portions of Garco's Reply Memorandum in Support
of Motion to Revise Order Dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint.

05/01/98

The trial court entered an Order denying Garco's Rule 54(b) Motion, and granting
ROA's Motion to Strike. The trial court also entered an Order dismissing ROA's
counterclaim. This resolved all claims and issues between all parties, making the
trial court's orders final for purposes of appeal.

06/01/98

Garco filed and served its Notice of Appeal.

RELEVANT FACTS
On appeal from summary judgment, the appellate court looks at all facts in a light most
favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. Culp Construction Company v. Buildmart
Mali, 795 P.2d 650, 651 (Utah 1990). Applying that standard, the record facts are:
1.

ROA claims on July 8, 1975 ROA as lessee and Jack Gordon and James Lamont as

lessors, signed a ROA form document entitled "Sign Location Lease" describing a location in Salt
Lake County of "3986 South 1-15, see attached tax notice for description hereby incorporated by
r

eference, exhibit'A'." ROA erected an outdoor advertising sign on the property. No one recorded

he lease at that time. [R 191, 193 (App. 3 1 2, 4, Ex. A); R 367 (App. 11 p.3 1 11)]
2.

On August 4, 1982 Gordon deeded his interest in the property to Lamont. The deed

lescribes the property later deeded to Garco. [R 365 (App. 11 t 1, Ex. 1)]

3.

In 1990 Garco began negotiating to buy the property. Then and now, the property

was used as a source of income from renting the property to others. Garco desired to buy the
property to obtain an income source from continuing to rent it out. Therefore, revenue-generating
leases on the property would enhance the property's value to Garco, and Lamont had an incentive
to disclose such leases to Garco. [R 365 (App. 11 if 2)]
4.

On February 2, 1990, Garco made Lamont an offer, which Lamont accepted on

February 15, 1990. [R 366, 370 (App. 11 f 3, Ex. 2)] The Agreement provides:
I. EXISTING TENANT LEASES. If Buyer is to take title subject to an existing
lease or leases, Seller agrees to provide to Buyer no later than fifteen (15) days after
Seller's acceptance of this Agreement, but not less than three (3) days prior to
closing, a copy of all existing leases (and any amendments thereto) affecting the
property. Unless written objection is given by Buyer to Seller or Seller's agent
within three (3) working days thereafter, Buyer shall take title subject to such leases.
5.

In fulfillment of his obligation under paragraph I of the Agreement, Lamont

provided the following sworn and notarized statement with attachments:
I, Rick Lamont, seller do hereby warrant that all leases/rental agreements are on a
month to month basis with the exceptions listed below and attached hereto. And that
there are no other agreements written or oral which will be binding upon the buyer,
shop #31
Steven E. Cross
expires 12-01-90
shop # 50
Steven E. Cross
expires 12-01-90
shop #33
Brigido Zamora
expires 07-06-90
shop #49
Gary Walter
expires 12-01-91
shop # 65
Chris Christensen
expires 10-01-94
[R 366, 374 (App. 11 f 5, Ex. 3)] Lamont also provided a written list showing that 54 rental units,
along with the sign, were generating rental income. Of those, according to Lamont, only 5 rental
units, and not the sign, were subject to written leases. [R 366, 379 (App. 11 \ 6, Ex. 4)] Lamont
told Garco that ROA had no written lease, and was making payments under an oral monthly lease.
[R 366 (App. 11 17)]
6.

Lamont also gave Garco his files on the property. Garco' s agent examined those files

and confirmed there was no signed lease with ROA. There was no lease document of any form

signed either by Lamont, Gordon or ROA. None of the pages of the document ROA now offers
as its purported lease, signed or unsigned, were in the file. [R 367 (App. 11 f 8)] Garco's agent
knew of other instances where ROA was renting on a monthly basis without a written lease, and
understood it was not uncommon for ROA to do so. [R 367 (App. 11 f 9)]
7.

On February 22, 1990 U.P.C., Inc. purchased the Garco property in good faith and

for a valuable consideration. Lamont delivered a signed warranty deed to the property to Garco.
On March 2, 1990 Garco recorded its warranty deed. [R 367, 380 (App. 11 1 10, Ex. 5); R 258,
262 (App. 5 HI, Ex. 1)]
8.

In May of 1991 Joe Kingston for Garco met with Dick Paxman, ROA's agent.

Kingston told Paxman Garco and ROA did not have a lease, and that ROA needed to sign a lease
or move its sign.

Paxman, acting within his authority as ROA's agent, did not controvert

Kingston's remarks, and admitted ROA had no valid lease. [R 232 (App. 4 Ex. 5 p. 47)]
9.

By letter dated June 18, 1991 Garco notified ROA there was no written lease for

ROA's sign, and that if ROA had wanted to negotiate a lease it should contact Garco. ROA did not
respond to Garco's letter. [R 361, 364 (App. 12 f 1, 2, Ex. 1)]
10.

In or about June of 1992 ROA's agent Doug Hall came to Joe Kingston's office to

discuss a lease. Hall offered to enter a lease at $7,200.00 per year, retroactive to June 1, 1991, and
agreed to delete from ROA's form lease provisions giving ROA a right of first refusal option on the
property, to make any renewals on a year-to-year basis, and to delete the non-compete clause. [R
234-235 (App. 4 Ex. 5 p. 54-60)]
11.

In about August of 1992 Kingston and Hall met again. The parties agreed to a ten

year lease at $7,800.00 per year the first five years, effective June 1, 1991, and $8,400.00 per year
the second five years. The parties also agreed, among other things, to delete from ROA's standard

lease agreement the noncompete clause and the purchase option; and modified the automatic renewal
provision. Hall reduced the agreement to writing by modifying ROA's form agreement in his own
handwriting. Kingston wanted ROA to sign the agreement first so ROA couldn't make other
changes after Garco signed. Hall said he wanted to have the draft agreement cleaned up and made
more presentable before he added his signature. Therefore, the parties agreed to execute the agreedon lease when ROA cleaned it up. [R 236-38, 240, 250 (App. 4 Ex. 5 p. 64 72, 106-107, Ex. 4)]
12.

In October of 1992 Hall told Joe Kingston if Garco would not agree to modify the

terms of the lease they negotiated in August, ROA would remove its sign from Garco's premises,
and erect another sign north of Garco within 500 feet of Garco's south property line, because ROA
didn't want Garco doing business with anyone but ROA. [R 244 (App. 4 Ex. 5 p. 157-58)]
13.

On December 14, 1992, two years after Garco recorded its deed, a year after ROA

admitted it had no lease, and four months after the parties had agreed to a different lease, ROA
finally recorded its 1975 lease. [R 258, 262-266 (App. 5 1 2 , Ex. 2)] 1
14.

By letter dated February 10, 1993 ROA claimed ownership of the by-then annexed

sign, and for the first time claimed Garco was bound by the 1975 lease:
In the meantime the current lease remains in full force and effect. The sign structure
and faces are the property of Reagan Outdoor and may not be removed by anyone
without our permission. Neither you nor your client has that permission.
Treble civil damages and other penalties are available to Reagan under the provisions
of section 27-12-136.9 of the Utah Code should your clients, their agents or assigns,
attempt the removal of, or cause damage to, the sign.
[R 251 (App. 4 Ex. 5 - depo Ex. 11)]

Although the document ROA recorded was dated July 8, 1975, it was notarized by
a seal that expired February 15, 1995. [App. 5 f 3, Ex. 2] While paragraph 1 of the recorded
document recites, "see attached tax notice for description hereby incorporated by reference, exhibit
"A", ROA's recorded exhibit "A" is not a tax notice. Therefore, the document in its recorded form
did not exist until long after Garco bought the property.

15.

Laws regulating outdoor advertising signs prohibit the placement of such signs in the

area of Garco closer than 500 feet apart. The Utah Outdoor Advertising Act provided: 2
§27-12-136.5(2)(a): Any sign allowed to be erected ... shall not be closer than 500
feet to an existing off-premise sign adjacent to an interstate highway ....
16.

ROA owned a sign located over 500 feet south of Garco's southern boundary line.

ROA also once owned a sign located over 500 feet north of its Garco sign and over 600 feet north
of Garco' s southern boundary. The northern boundary of the Garco' s northern neighbor, Mollerup
Moving and Storage, is slightly over 500 feet from Garco's southern property line. This makes it
possible to lawfully erect two signs over 500 feet apart, one on Mollerup's property and the other
on Garco's property. [R 259, 267 (App. 5 1f 4, Ex. 3)]
17.

On February 23, 1995 Garco instructed ROA to remove its sign before July 8, 1995.

[R 185 (App. 2 p.6 f 21, Kingston depo Ex 17)]
18.

On April 20, 1995 ROA, without notifying Garco, leased a sign location from

Garco's neighbor to the north, Mollerup Moving and Storage. On April 24, 1995, also without
notice to Garco, ROA applied to UDOT to move UDOT Permit No. 2-0966 to the Mollerup
property. Permit No. 2-0966 was not for the Garco sign, which was under UDOT Permit No. 20547. [R 191 (App. 3 1 4 , 5); R 295, 297-298 (App. 7 f 3, 4, Ex. A, B); R 345-348 (App. 8 UDOT log)]
19.

ROA completed its new sign on the Mollerup property by June 1, 1995. [R 191

;App. 3 f 6)] ROA's Permit No. 2-0547 was still on the Garco sign when, on or about June 19,
1995, Reagan cut the Garco sign off and left the foundation. ROA never did attach Permit No. 2)966, the permit for the sign ROA had applied to move, to the Mollerup sign. Instead, ROA
eventually transferred Permit No. 2-0547 to the Mollerup sign. [R 273 (App. 6 p. 6)]
2

Utah Code Ann. §27-12-136.5 has been renumbered as section 72-7-505.

20.

ROA, not Mollerup, chose the new sign's north-south placement.

ROA told

Mollerup ROA needed the sign to be about 20 feet or so south of Mollerup's northern Boundary.
Mollerup told ROA the sign would be more in its way there, but ROA insisted, so Mollerup
acquiesced in ROA's choice of location. The sign could have been placed at Mollerup's northern
boundary. Such a placement would actually have been better for Mollerup, as it would interfere
less with Mollerup's own use of the area. [R 259-260, 267 (App. 5 1f 6, Ex. 3)]
21.

It is readily apparent from inspecting the Mollerup property that ROA's sign could

easily have been placed at Mollerup's northern boundary; that ROA's placement of the sign just
south of the boundary was more inconvenient to Mollerup than placing the sign at the boundary
would have been; and that the difference between the two locations would have no effect on ROA's
ability to sell advertising space on the sign. [R 260, 267 (App. 5 f 7, Ex. 3)]
22.

ROA erected its new sign just under 500 feet from Garco's south boundary and well

within 500 feet of the Garco sign. When Garco saw the sign it asked ROA why ROA had located
the new sign as it did. ROA told Garco it was for the specific purpose to prevent Garco from doing
business with anyone else. [R 259, 267 (App. 5 1 5, Ex. 3); R 243-244, 249 ( App. 4 Ex. 5 p.
155-158, 177)]
23.

It was always Garco's intent, and until ROA actually removed the sign, ROA's

expressed intent, to remove the Garco sign foundation as part of the sign removal. By letter dated
June 12, 1995 ROA admitted it was obligated to remove the foundation as part of the sign removal,
and represented it would remove the foundation [R 246-247, 254 (App. 4 Ex. 5 p. 165-172, Ex.
21]:
Unless I hear from you within the next 5 working days, I will assume that you want
us to remove the sign structure and we will begin to do so. In addition, in order to
remove the foundation we will need to tie up your parking lot for 3 to 4 days.

24.

Even with the top removed, ROA's sign foundations have intrinsic monetary value

to ROA in excess of their removal cost, and can be economically used in the building of other signs.
In R.O.A. General Inc. v. Lynn D. Kitchen et ai. Civil No. 940905728PR (Utah 3d Dist. Ct.)
ROA testified a sign foundation was valuable and could be reused:
THE COURT: Mr. Reagan, does that foundation have any value other than hooking
to Mr. Rogers' ankle and throwing it?
MR. REAGAN: Yes, there is about 20 feet of steel pipe there. ... And we want
to use that steel pipe and that foundation to rebuild the other sign. ... We don't
want to destroy their sign. ... We just want to get our pipe, remove our foundation.
[R 219 (App. 4, Ex. 1) - Testimony of Reagan, hearing transcript p. 55 lines 6-22, R.O.A. General,
Inc. v. Lynn D. Kitchen et al, Civil No. 940905728PR (Utah 3d Dist. Ct.)]
25.

Garco was not concerned that removing the sign foundation would harm the building.

ROA did not damage the building when ROA first erected the sign. Garco only wanted ROA to use
due care when removing the sign foundation to so as not to damage the building. ROA could safely
remove the foundation by having qualified people do the work. [R 245-247 (App. 4 Ex. 5 p. 161162, 165-172)] By letter dated June 19, 1997, Garco reminded ROA not to damage the building
when removing the sign, and warned ROA it could leave the sign foundation only if it left the entire
sign structure intact and abandoned both the foundation and the sign poles to Garco:
He [Joe Kingston] did mention that he was concerned that unless you provide
additional support for the building near the sign, the building foundation will be
undermined when the sign foundation is removed. I believe that you will agree that
any removal activity you pursue must be done is such a way that the Garco property
is not damaged. One suggestion that Joe made was that Garco may agree to allow
you to just remove the top part of the structure and leave the foundation and poles
in place. This way, you would avoid the expense and time of removing the
foundation and Garco may be able to use the structure for its own sign, should it
chose [sic] to do so at a later time.
[R 253 (App. 4 Ex. 5 - depo Ex. 19)]
26.

Despite ROA's June 12, 1995 letter acknowledging its duty to remove the foundation,

ROA told its crew to cut the sign off and leave the foundation. On July 19, 1995, before ROA

began removing the Garco sign, Joe Kingston again told ROA to remove the foundation. When
Kingston learned ROA was planning just to cut the sign off, Kingston spoke to ROA's crew chief,
telling him ROA had to take the foundation as well. The crew chief called ROA, then returned and
again started cutting off the sign but leaving the foundation. Kingston immediately called ROA and
said, "In no conversation have I ever given you permission to do it any other way. It's not
acceptable. It needs to be taken out." ROA replied it was still going to cut off the sign and leave
the foundation, which ROA did. [R 244-246, 252, 253 (App. 4 Ex. 5 p. 159-168, depo. 18, 19)]
27.

By letter dated August 9, 1995 ROA informed Garco:

In regards to another matter, that being the possibility of locating an outdoor
advertising structure somewhere upon this location at a point to be determined in the
future, I would greatly appreciate you facilitating a meeting between myself and Joe
[Joe Kingston], as we seem to have a hard time connecting. I look forward to
facilitating a mutually beneficial business relationship in the near future and await
word from Joe.
[R 255 (App. 4 Ex. 5. Ex. 21)] The only way Garco and ROA could have "a mutually beneficial
business relationship in the near future" would be if ROA moved its MoUerup sign a few feet to the
north, so the sign would be more than 500 feet form Garco's south boundary line, showing ROA
had control over placement of the sign.
28.

By letter dated September 11, 1995 ROA again admitted ROA's placement of the

MoUerup sign was within ROA's control, that ROA's choice for placement of the MoUerup sign
was for the purpose of preventing Garco from dealing with anyone but ROA, and that ROA had left
the demolished Garco sign on Garco's property, and would move its MoUerup sign, if Garco would
agree to a lease on ROA's terms:
In regards to the possibility of our parties entering into a new lease agreement which,
as I stated above was the only topic that Joe and I discussed, I will contact them in
the very near future with a proposal the subject of which will be leasing the South
West corner of your property in order to erect a new outdoor advertising structure.
Should our parties be able to agree on a new ground lease, I would be willing to
discuss possible further action at the old site. It is my hope that we can consummate

a lease agreement in that spot and thus facilitate a new business relationship between
our two parties.
[R 256 (App. 4 Ex. 5 - depo Ex 23)]
29.

On July 29, 1996, Garco served ROA with a Notice of Unlawful Detainer. [R 3

(Complaint f 16); R 60 (Amended Answer f 7); R 257 (App. 4 Ex. 5 - depo Ex 27)]
30.

ROA still refuses to remove its sign foundation.

[R 2 (Complaint if 9); R 59

(Amended Answer 14,5); ROA's Motion for Summary Judgment and memoranda generally.]

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

The trial court erred in dismissing Garco's claim for trespass based solely on findings that
there was a 1975 lease between ROA and Garco's predecessor, which did not expressly require
ROA to remove its entire sign structure and restore the premises when the lease ended. Garco was
not bound by the 1975 lease because Garco had neither record notice nor actual notice of the lease,
and Garco made a reasonable inquiry which failed to disclose any such document, making the 1975
lease void as to Garco pursuant to the recording statute, U.C.A. §§57-3-103. In addition, Garco
was entitled to avoid the lease for both substantive and procedural unconscionability.
The trial court also erred in dismissing Garco's trespass claim because under the common
law ROA was obligated, at the end of its leasehold, either to abandon its annexed sign to Garco or
to remove the entire structure and restore the premises. When ROA did neither, but instead
committed what during its tenancy would have been an act of waste by cutting off the sign and
leaving the foundation, it committed an act of trespass.
The trial court also erred in dismissing Garco's trespass claim because, even assuming the
1975 lease was relevant, the terms of that document construed as a whole with a purpose to

effectuate the parties' intent, required ROA at the end of the lease either to abandon the sign
structure or to remove it and restore the premises.
The trial court erred in dismissing Garco's unlawful detainer claim because ROA to this day
remains the owner of its sign foundation.

By refusing to retrieve its property from Garco's

premises after receiving the required statutory notice, ROA is in unlawful detainer.
The trial court erred in dismissing Garco's claim for intentional interference with prospective
economic relationships. The Utah Outdoor Advertising Act prohibits outdoor advertising signs
along the freeway corridor from being erected within 500 feet of each other. ROA erected another
sign on property of Garco's north neighbor, just within 500 feet of Garco's southern boundary, then
cut off and removed its Garco sign, leaving the foundation, for the express purpose of preventing
Garco from contracting with any other outdoor advertiser. ROA's acts were not for a legitimate
economic purpose, because ROA's competitors could still contract with Garco's neighbor to the
south, and it actually cost ROA money not to retrieve its foundation. The trial court erred in ruling
as a matter of law that ROA did not have a predominant purpose to injure Garco. ROA also
engaged in a pattern of wrongful conduct including trespass, violation of statutes and regulations
regarding outdoor advertising and ongoing misrepresentations to Garco, which in whole or part
constitute improper means.
Because the trial court improperly dismissed Garco's tort claims, it also improperly
dismissed Garco's punitive damages claim.
The trial court erred in striking portions of Garco's Reply Memorandum in Support of
Motion to Revise Order and Judgment Dismissing Plaintiffs Complaint. It was error to strike
arguments for purposes of appeal after the trial court had considered and ruled on those arguments
on the merits. In addition, the stricken arguments were proper rebuttal arguments.

ARGUMENT
In Garco's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Revise Order and Judgment Dismissing
Plaintiff's Complaint, Garco incorporated all arguments it had raised earlier in the parties' cross
motions for summary judgment:
Garco incorporates here by reference its November 17, 1997 Memorandum in
Support of Plaintiff s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment ...
This includes the law in Garco's Memoranda on the cross motions for summary
judgment, for brevity's sake incorporated here by reference.
The trial court considered all of Garco's arguments, past and present, in denying Garco's
motion to revise. [R 513 (App. 22 f 1)] All issues raised in the parties' cross motions for summary
judgment and in Garco's motion to revise are therefore ripe for review before this Court.

I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING GARCO'S TRESPASS CLAIM
BASED ON FINDINGS THAT THERE WAS A LEASE BETWEEN ROA AND
GARCO'S PREDECESSOR, AND THAT THE LEASE DID NOT EXPRESSLY
REQUIRE REMOVING THE SIGN AND RESTORING THE PREMISES.
Garco's First Claim for Relief is for trespass. In dismissing Garco's trespass claim the trial

court ruled [R 437 (App. 13)]:
1.
The Court finds that there are no material factual disputes with respect to
whether there was a lease between defendant and plaintiff's predecessor-in-interest.
The undisputed evidence is that there was a lease between defendant and plaintiff's
predecessor-in-interest. The face of the lease documents itself does not require
removal of the sign foundation of which plaintiff has complained. Nor does the face
of the lease document require that the defendant restore the property to its former
condition upon vacating the property. Therefore, as a matter of law, defendant did
not and has not trespassed on plaintiff's property by leaving the sign foundation in
place when defendant removed the sign face and poles from the plaintiffs property.
Plaintiff's First Cause of Action is therefore dismissed with prejudice.
The trial court erred in relying on the 1975 lease in dismissing Garco's Complaint and in
denying Garco's motion to revise. First, unless the 1975 lease is enforceable against Garco, its
terms are irrelevant. The trial court made no findings whether Garco was bound by the 1975 lease.

Garco was not so bound. Next, the trial court's conclusion (that because the lease did not expressly
require removal of the sign ROA could not be in trespass) is an erroneous conclusion of law. In
the absence of a contrary agreement, ROA was required to remove its property when its leasehold
ended. Finally, even if Garco was bound by the 1975 lease, the document construed as a whole
required ROA on termination of its leasehold to remove its sign including the foundation.

A.

Garco Is Not Bound In I in I*>75 Lease.

1.

Garco Bought the Property Without Notice of the 1975 Lease.
Garco had no record notice of the 1975 lease. U.C.A. §57-3-103 3 provides:
Each document not recorded as provided in this title is void as against any
subsequent purchaser of the same real property, or any portion of it, if:
(1)
the subsequent purchaser purchased the property in good faith
and for a valuable consideration; and
(2)

the subsequent purchaser's document is first duly recorded.

The undisputed evidence is that on February 22, 1990 Garco purchased the property in good
faith and for a valuable consideration. On March 2, 1990 Garco recorded its warranty deed. ROA
did not record its lease until December 14, 1992, over two years after Garco recorded its deed.
Under section 57-3-103 the 1975 lease was void as against Garco.
In Diversified Equities v. American Savings & Loan Assn., 739 P.2d 1133, 1136 (Utah
App. 1587), this Court stated:
As for the "actual notice" exception of Utah Code Ann. §57-1-6 (1986), 4
the stipulated facts make clear Peck and Pentlute did not have actual knowledge of
American's interest. However, the exception is also triggered if a party dealing with
the land has information of facts which would put a prudent person upon an inquiry
which, if pursued, would lead to actual knowledge as to the state of the title.

U.C.A. §57-3-3 has been renumbered as section 57-3-103.
The "actual notice" exception of former §57-1-6 is now at §57-3-102(3).

Garco had no actual notice of the 1975 lease As to any duty of inquiry required under the
Diversified Equities line of cases,
All that is required of a party who is put upon inquiry is good faith and reasonable
care in following up the inquiry, if due and diligent inquiry or investigation is made,
and notwithstanding it, no knowledge of the outstanding interest is acquired, the
purchaser will have fully discharged the duty to inquire and will not be charged with
further notice
77 Am Jur 2d Vendor and Purchaser §454
Garco exercised good faith and reasonable care in inquiring into the status of ROA's sign
Garco wanted the property for its rental income Garco and Lamont (Garco's predecessor) executed
a contract requiring Lamont to disclose all existing leases Lamont had not only the legal duty but
an economic incentive to be truthful Lamont provided a sworn and notarized statement that except
for certain shop units, all leases affecting the property, including ROA's, were on month to month
oral rentals Lamont also told Garco that ROA had no written lease Garco was entitled to rely on
Lamont's sworn statement and verbal confirmation that ROA had no written lease
Garco's inquiry did not stop there Lamont also surrendered his files to Garco The 1975
lease was not in the file

5

There was no executed sign lease of any kind m those files Garco knew

other instances where ROA was renting sign location space on a monthly basis without a written
lease, and understood it was not uncommon for ROA to do so

From February of 1990 until

February of 1993, including the first several months while Garco was attempting to negotiate a
lease, ROA never claimed it had a valid written lease, yet alone disclose the existence of the 1975
lease As did the buyer inDiveisified, Gaico inquiied as to ROA's status, with sufficient diligence
to meet any duty of reasonable inquirv it may have had

5

The 1975 lease did not exist in its recorded toim, until late in 1992 No amount of
inquiiy by Gaico in 1990 would have disclosed the document as it was lecoided

Because Garco had neither actual nor record notice, and made a reasonable inquiry that did
not lead to disclosure of the 1975 lease, Garco acquired the property free and clear of the 1975 lease
and was not bound by its terms. Therefore, the trial court erred in relying on the terms of the 1975
lease as a basis for dismissing the Complaint.
2.

The 1975 Lease Was Voidable for Unconscionability and Lack of Consideration.
Each contract must be assessed under the differing factual circumstances of each case,

Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch, 706 P.2d 1028, 1041 (Utah 1985). A contract may
be avoided for substantive unconscionability. Gross disparity in terms can support a finding of
unconscionability. Id. at 1043. This is normally a question of fact:
Substantive unconscionability is indicated by "contract terms so one-sided as
to suppress or unfairly surprise an innocent party," "an overall imbalance in the
obligations and rights imposed by the bargain," excessive price, or significant costprice disparity. ... [T]he terms are to be evaluated "in the light of the general
commercial background and the commercial needs of the particular trade or case."
Id. at 1041-42 (citations omitted).
The 1975 lease was substantively unconscionable. ROA would have the unilateral right to
recover expenses and attorney fees in the event of a breach by the lessor. [R 193 (App. 3 Ex. A f
9)] The Lessor would have no reciprocal right, to recover its attorney fees in a suit for unpaid rent
(ROA's only express contractual duty)

fees which would almost certainly exceed any damages,

in effect depriving the lessor of any effective remedy if ROA should breach the lease.
ROA would remain the owner of all signs and improvements, and would have the right to
remove or change the same "at any time." [R 193 (App. 3 Ex. A f3)] ROA claims this term gives
it rights not only during the lease, but "at any time" for aye and always -- in effect, ROA claims
an easement to store its property in perpetuity, for which it pays nothing beyond the lease period.
The lease states for five years after the end of the lease the lessor cannot rent any part of the
premises to any other outdoor advertiser. This restriction includes property fronting on 300 West

and over 3 acres of other property ROA never occupied. [R 193 (App. 3 Ex. A 14] Even the trial
court could not find this restriction reasonable:
3.
The Court finds that there are factual issues with respect to whether the fiveyear non-compete clause in the lease constitutes a reasonable period of time ....
[R 437 (App. 13 p. 2] The non-compete clause on its face is unconscionable as a contract in
restraint of trade, in violation of Utah antitrust law. Taken as a whole, the 1975 lease is so onesided as to be substantively unconscionable.
The 1975 lease also would supposedly give ROA a ten year tenancy at a paltry $50.00 per
month, renewable at ROA's sole discretion at $80.00 per month. For this pittance ROA would have
the exclusive use for outdoor advertising, not just of a small plot to erect one sign, but of the entire
3.3 acres, and including all the land and improvements. If ROA, at its sole discretion and for any
reason or no reason at all, chose to display no advertising copy, ROA could unilaterally reduce the
lessor's income to $5.00 per month, effectively nothing. [R 193 (App. 3 Ex. A ff 1-4, 10)]
When there exists only the facade of a promise, i.e., a statement made in
such vague or conditional terms that the person making it commits himself to
nothing, the alleged "promise" is said to be "illusory". An illusory promise, neither
binds the person making it, 1 Corbin on Contracts §145 (1963), nor functions as
consideration for a return promise.
Id., 706 P.2d at 1036. ROA's effective control over whether it paid rent would make ROA's
promise of payment illusory, and the lease void for lack of consideration.
A contract is also unenforceable if procedurally unconscionable:
Indices of procedural unconscionability include "[t]he use of printed form or
boilerplate contracts drawn skillfully by the party in the strongest economic
position," generally offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, phrasing contractual terms
"in language that is incomprehensible to a layman or that diverts] his attention from
the problems raised by them or the rights given up through them," hiding key
contractual provisions in a maze of fine print, or in an inconspicuous part of the
document, minimizing key contractual provisions by deceptive sales practices, "lack
of opportunity for meaningful negotiation," whether the aggrieved party was
compelled to accept the terms, and "exploitation of the underprivileged,
unsophisticated, uneducated and illiterate.

Resource Management at 1042 (citations omitted).

Several of these "indices of procedural

unconscionability" exist here. The 1975 lease is a printed form or boilerplate contract drawn
skillfully by ROA, offered (as ROA's negotiating tactics prove) on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, and
drafted by ROA so as to divert the lessor's attention from the problems imposed on the lessor by
the document terms, and diverting the lessor's attention from the extent of the rights the lessor gives
up. ROA's "negotiation" tactics with Garco from 1992 through 1995 show ROA does not give the
party on the other side of the table a chance for meaningful negotiation.

B.

ROA Was Obligated by Law to Remove the Entire Sign.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts summarizes the common law of trespass. Section 158

states, "One is subject to liability to another for trespass ... if he intentionally ... (c) fails to remove
from the land a thing which he is under a duty to remove." Section 170 states, "A consent given
by a possessor of land to the actor's presence on the land during a specified period of time does not
create a privilege to enter or remain on the land at any other time." Section 160 states:
A trespass may be committed by the continued presence on the land of a
structure ... the actor or his predecessor in legal interest has placed on the land (a)
with the consent of the person then in possession of the land, if the actor fails to
remove it after the consent has been effectively terminated .... (Comment g) "Even
though the actor ... has not agreed to remove the structure ... from the land upon the
termination of the license pursuant to which it was placed there, ... the termination
of the license creates a situation in which the rule stated in this Section applies."
ROA to this day owns the sign foundation. No lease provision gave ROA any consent,
right, privilege or license to remain in possession of the Garco premises beyond the rental term.
By keeping its property on Garco's premises after all consent to the property's continued presence
terminated, ROA was and is in trespass.

The Restatement (Second) of Property, §12.2 states:
(1)
Except to the extent the parties to a lease validly agree otherwise, the tenant
is entitled to make changes in the physical condition of the leased property which are
reasonably necessary in order for the tenant to use the leased property in a manner
that is reasonable under all the circumstances.
(2)
In situations not described in subsection 1, except to the extent the parties to
a lease validly agree otherwise, there is a breach of the tenant's obligation if he
makes changes in the physical condition of the leased property and the leased
property ... is not restored promptly after a request from the landlord to do so ....
(3)
Except to the extent the parties to a lease validly agree otherwise, there is a
breach of the tenant's obligation if he makes permissible changes in the leased
property and does not, when requested by the landlord, restore, where restoration
is possible, the lease property to its former condition ....
As shown in part 1(A) supra, ROA had no written lease with Garco. At best ROA had a
right to erect and maintain a sign during its tenancy. To cut off that sign and leave the foundation
would be a change in the property that was not reasonably necessary in order for ROA to use the
property in a reasonable manner. It would also be a breach of ROA's obligation for ROA to make
even permissible changes in the property and then not, when requested by Garco, restore the
property to its former condition. Garco made such a request. In response ROA cut its sign
structure in two, intentionally left part of the destroyed sign in place on Garco's property, and did
not restore the property, all in breach of ROA's duty to Garco. Moreover,
The owner of an easement is said to have all rights incident or necessary to its proper
enjoyment, but nothing more. And, if he exceeds his rights either in the manner or
extent of its use, he becomes a trespasser to the extent of the unauthorized use.
25 Am. Jur. 2d Easements §72. By cutting off its sign and leaving the foundation, ROA exceeded
its rights in the manner and extent of its use of Garco's property, and thereby became a trespasser.
The Restatement (Second) of Property §12.2 goes on to state:
(4)
Except to the extent the parties to a lease validly agree otherwise, the tenant
is entitled to remove permissible annexation he has made to the leased property ...
if the leased property can be and is restored to its former condition ...
(5)
In situations not described in subsection (4), except to the extent the parties
to the lease validly agree otherwise, there is a breach of the tenant's obligation if he
removes or attempts to remove annexations he has made to the leased property
without the consent of the landlord ...

ROA and Garco did not "agree otherwise." ROA was entitled to the annexation only if it
restored the property to its former condition after the removal. The only alternative Garco would
consent to was for ROA to leave the sign structure intact, so Garco could use it at a later date.
ROA had a duty either to leave the entire annexed sign structure intact, or to remove the entire sign
and restore the premises to their former condition. When ROA instead cut off the annexed sign but
left the foundation in place and failed to restore the property to its former condition, it violated its
duty and thereby committed a trespass.
ROA was subject to a duty to avoid waste, a tort arising from the destruction, misuse,
alteration, or neglect of premises by one legally in possession, to the prejudice of the estate or other
interest of another. Hansen v. Green River Corp.. 748P.2d 1102, 1106 (Utah App. 1488); 78 Am.
Jur. 2d Waste §18. ROA's mutilation of the sign was an act of destruction, misuse or alteration of
the premises, to the prejudice of Garco's interest. 78 Am. Jur. 2d Waste §2 distinguishes between
waste and trespass:
Waste is distinguished from trespass in that the injurious or wasteful act is
committed in the former case by one who is, and in the latter case by one who is not,
in lawful possession of the premises involved or affected. Although acts injurious
to the substance of an estate, committed by a stranger to the title, or by one who,
although in possession of the premises, is not rightfully entitled to such possession
are sometimes characterized as waste, they do not constitute waste in the technical
legal sense of the term, but fall within the category of trespass and are governed by
the principles applicable to that species of tort.
One in possession under a temporary tenancy is liable for waste if injury results to the
reversionary estate from his unreasonable use of the premises. Id. §21. Utah recognizes a tenant's
duty not to commit waste, even in the absence of an express covenant to avoid waste. See Cluff v.
Culmer, 556 P.2d 498, 499 (Utah 1976):
They do not contend that there is any express covenant therein that a seller, as
tenant, will not cause waste or damage on the premises, but they urge that there is
an implied covenant in any landlord-tenant relationship that the tenant will not
commit such waste. With that we agree, [emphasis added]

ROA had a duty not to commit waste or otherwise damage Garco's reversionary interest.
Having agreed and undertaken to remove the structure, ROA had a duty to remove the entire
structure, and to restore the premises after removing the structure. ROA breached that duty by
cutting the sign in two and leaving the foundation on the premises. Because ROA was no longer
a lawful tenant in possession when it committed what would otherwise be waste, its act is an
actionable, continuing trespass. It was error for the trial court to rule no trespass occurred.
The trial court's ruling amounts to a finding ROA possessed the property after any lease
ended under a claim of privilege. ROA waived any claim to privilege by failing to plead it as an
affirmative defense. U.R.C.P. Rule 8, 12(h).
The Court should consider the consequences of a holding that a tenant can with impunity
demolish annexed improvements and leave the waste on its lessor's land. If ROA succeeds here,
ROA will be able to do to all of its landlords what it did to Garco. ROA could dispose of its solid
waste on others' property throughout the Wasatch Front, to the surprise, disappointment and
frustrated expectations of all those left to deal with ROA's waste as best they can. Taken to its
logical conclusion, ROA's waste could unnecessarily impede new construction, and hinder repairs
to existing improvements. Utilities would have to remove, go around or through ROA's waste to
lay water, sewage, gas and electric lines. Cities and counties would have to deal with ROA's waste
when constructing sidewalks and enlarging roads. ROA's act would become a new species of courtsanctioned environmental pollution, the cost being foisted on ROA's victims.
ROA's conduct flies in the face of public policy concerns over environmental quality. The
Environmental Quality Code, U.C.A. Title 19 and related regulations, control the disposal of
"construction waste" including concrete and steel from demolition of structures (U.C.A. §19-6101(4)(a), R315-301-2(16)). The state's policy is to require disposal of solid waste at designated

facilities only, and to make the generator of waste responsible for its disposal. See R315-301-3
("The ... operator ... of any premises ... shall be responsible for the ... disposal of all solid waste
generated or accumulated by the ... operator "); R315-301-4 ("No person shall ... dispose of any
solid waste in any place except at a facility which is in compliance with the requirements of these
and other applicable rules."). ROA generated solid waste and disposed of it on Garco's property.
To relieve ROA of the responsibility of disposal by letting ROA abandon its waste on Garco's
property not only thwarts the reasonable expectations of contracting landlords, it thwarts public
policy by relieving waste generators of responsibility to dispose of their own waste.
The trial court's order represents a radical departure from existing property and landlordtenant law. It contravenes the policy limiting environmental pollution and making the generators
of waste responsible for its disposal. Any such shift in the law involves major policy considerations
that belong in the hands of the legislature. If ROA remains the owner of its signs and has the right
to remove them, the law must also hold ROA accountable when ROA disposes of its waste on the
property of its landlords.

C.

The 1975 Lease Required Removal of the Entire Sign.
Even assuming Garco was bound by the 1975 lease, that document must be construed as a

whole, with the purpose to effectuate the parties' intention:
In interpreting a contract, we determine what the parties intended by examining the
entire contract and all of its parts in relation to each other, giving an objective and
reasonable construction to the contract as a whole. The cardinal rule is to give effect
to the intentions of the parties and, if possible, to glean those intentions from the
contract itself. Additionally, a contract should be interpreted so as to harmonize all
of its terms and provisions, and all of its terms should be given effect if possible.
G.G.A., Inc. v. Leventis, 773 P.2d 841, 845 (Utah App. 1589) (citations omitted).

Paragraph 6 of the 1975 lease provides, "Lessee is and shall remain the owner of all signs
and improvements placed by Lessee on said property and has the right to remove or change the
same at any time." Taken out of context, the provision would appear to allow ROA to keep its sign
on the property in perpetuity, and return repeatedly even succeeding decades after the lease expired
to change advertising copy or remove the sign. But no reasonable person would construe the
provision to allow ROA to keep its property on the premises and to remove it, if at all, "at any
time" in the indefinite future after the lease ended. The provision must be construed in harmony
with the document's other provisions, including provisions that (a) the lease was for a fixed, limited
term; (b) only during the rental term, but not after, ROA would pay to occupy the premises; (c)
only during the rental term, ROA could erect signs, but not other structures without signs; (c) and
(d) after the rental term expired the lessor could lease the identical premises to others. Construing
the 1975 lease as a whole, paragraph 6 only applied during the leasehold term, and gave ROA no
rights after its leasehold ended.
Even under the 1975 ROA would nave no right to use the premises other than as the lease
allowed. The 1975 lease gave ROA the right to use the premises only "for the purpose of erecting
painted, printed, or illuminated advertising signs, including necessary structures, devices and
connections." ROA was given no right to erect any other structures.
ROA could not cut off its sign and leave the foundation in the ground. Any right under
paragraph 7 "to remove or change" a sign would be subject to this contractual limitation on ROA's
use of the property. ROA could remove a sign, but could not thereby erect a structure that was not
an advertising sign. Cutting off its sign structure and leaving the foundation amounted to erecting
a structure that was neither an advertising sign nor a necessary structure for an advertising sign, and
was a breach of ROA's express duty under paragraph 1 of the 1975 lease.

The 1975 lease is ambiguous on at least two points: whether ROA's right to remove a sign
encompassed a right to remove parts of a sign piecemeal; and whether the lease gave ROA rights
beyond the leasehold period. When a contract term is ambiguous the Court must construe it in
harmony with the parties' expressed intent. G.G.A.., supra. The parties' correspondence shows
they understood paragraph 7 to require removal of the entire structure, including the foundation,
before the lease expired. When the parties were unable to resolve their dispute, Garco and ROA
expressly agreed ROA would remove the foundation:
I am writing you this letter to follow up on the discussion we had last week. During
the course of that conversation you informed my that you would like to have Reagan
Outdoor Advertising remove its sign structure from your property located at 3986
South adjacent to the Interstate as soon as possible. At that time I stated that we
would begin removing the structure immediately and that is the manner in which we
will proceed.
Unless I hear from you within the next 5 working days, I will assume that you want
us to remove the sign structure and we will begin to do so. In addition, in order to
remove the foundation we will need to tie up your parking lot for 3 to 4 days.
/s/ Dewey Reagan
[R 252 (App. 4, depo Ex. 18] ROA's letter resolved any ambiguity, to make it clear the parties
mutually understood ROA did have a duty to remove its foundation. Any ambiguity still unresolved
must be construed against ROA as its drafter. Holley v. Federal-American Partners, 507 P.2d 381,
383 (Utah 1973). The trial court erred in ruling to the contrary.
The law implies in every rental agreement a covenant and duty of good faith and fair
dealing. Olympus Hills Center, LTD. v. Smith's Food, 889 P.2d 445, 450 & note 4 (Utah App.
1594). A party can breach that covenant even in exercising an express right. Leigh Furniture &
Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 311 (Utah 1982) (party breaches covenant of good faith if it fails
to exercise its contract rights reasonably). "The question is whether ... reasonable minds could
differ as to whether [lessee] wrongfully exercised this power for a reason beyond the risks that
[lessor] assumed in its lease with [lessee] or for a reason inconsistent with [lessor's] 'justified

expectations.'". Id. at 451. ROA's act was inconsistent with Garco's justified expectations. No
reasonable lessor would expect a tenant to partially demolish an annexed improvement, then retain
ownership of but leave the wasted portion, staying in possession of the premises after the lease
ended. The implied covenant of good faith required ROA either to remove its entire sign structure
or to leave the structure to Garco in a useable condition. When ROA instead cut off its sign and
left Garco with two useless chunks of solid waste, the resulting injury beyond Garco's expectations
was a trespass. The trial court erred in ruling otherwise.

II.

ROA BECAME IN UNLAWFUL DETAINER BY REFUSING TO REMOVE
ITS SIGN FOUNDATION AFTER RECEIVING NOTICE TO QUIT.
In dismissing Garco's unlawful detainer claim the trial court stated:
2.
The Court further finds that there are no material factual disputes as to
whether defendant returned possession of the property to the plaintiff prior to
plaintiffs service of a Notice to Quit. Defendant returned possession to plaintiff
when defendant completed removal of the sign faces and sign structure from
plaintiffs property no later than June 19, 1995. Plaintiffs Notice of Unlawful
Detainer was served more than a year later, on July 29, 1996. As a matter of law,
defendant is not liable for unlawful detainer of the property, having returned
possession of the property to plaintiff more than a year prior to the plaintiffs Notice
of Unlawful Detainer. Plaintiffs Second Cause of Action is hereby dismissed with
prejudice.

[R 437 (App. 13 p. 2)] This holding was erroneous. ROA even yet has not returned to Garco
possession of the portion of Garco's property ROA occupied before cutting off its sign.
Utah Code Ann. §78-36-3(1) provides:
A tenant of real property, for a term less than life, is guilty of an unlawful detainer:
(a)
when he continues in possession ... of the property or any part of it, after the
expiration of the specified term or period for which it is let to him, which specified
term or period ... shall be terminated without notice at the expiration of the specified
term or period;
(b)
when having leased real property for an indefinite time with monthly or other
periodic rent reserved: ... (ii) in cases of tenancies at will, where he remains in
possession of the premises after the expiration of a notice of not less than five days

ROA's conduct fits squarely within the statutory definition of unlawful detainer. Even under
ROA's theory the 1975 lease expired by July 8, 1996. The trial court's finding that "Defendant
returned possession to plaintiff when defendant completed removal of the sign faces and sign
structure from plaintiffs property" is contradicted by the evidence. ROA is still the proud owner
of its sign foundation, and is under a continuing duty to remove it [Point I supra.] The unlawful
detainer statute was triggered no later than Garco's Notice of Unlawful Detainer. [R 257 (App. 4,
Kingston depo Ex. 27] ROA having remained in possession after its leasehold entered and after
having been served with notice, ROA is liable for unlawful detainer.

III.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING ROA DID NOT INTENTIONALLY
INTERFERE WITH GARCO'S PROSPECTIVE ECONOMIC RELATIONS.
Utah recognizes the tort of intentional interference with prospective economic relations. A

plaintiff must prove (1) the defendant intentionally interfered with the plaintiff's potential economic
relations; (2) for an improper purpose or by improper means; (3) causing injury to the plaintiff.
Leigh Furniture, supra at 304. ROA challenged only the second element of the tort. The trial
court's order dismissing Garco's intentional interference claim was in error. [R 437-438 (App. 13
p. 3, 4)] There was substantial evidence both of improper purpose and of improper means.

A.

The Trial Court Erred in Ruling ROA Did Not Have a Predominant Improper Purpose.
As early as October of 1992, ROA told Garco if Garco did not contract with ROA on terms

dictated by ROA, ROA would remove its sign and erect another within 500 feet of Garco's southern
boundary, because ROA didn't want Garco doing business with anyone but ROA

in effect, that

Garco could lease to ROA on ROA's own terms, or could not lease, to ROA or anyone else, period.
That in itself is an improper purpose.

In Pratt v. Prodata, Inc.. 885 P.2d 786 (Utah 1994) the Court upheld a jury award for the
defendant's interference with economic relations for improper purposes. The defendant employer
and Pratt parted on bad terms. The defendant then used its influence with Pratt's new employer to
have Pratt fired, then offered to "clear things up" with the new employer if Pratt paid money to the
defendant. In upholding the jury's verdict, the Court noted:
There is substantial credible evidence in the record to support the jury's
determination that defendants interfered with Pratt's economic relations for an
improper purpose and without privilege ... Rather than suing Pratt for breach of the
Noncompete Covenant as it was legally entitled to do, Prodata utilized its contacts
at UDOT to have Pratt fired. ... [Defendants used the Noncompete Covenant to
threaten substantial liability and to demand a substantial payment from Pratt when
it knew that it had not suffered any actual damages from the breach. Thus, on the
facts before it, the jury could have found something akin to extortion in defendants'
motivation.
Id. at 789. Justice Stewart in his concurring opinion further noted (Id. at 791):
Defendants' action in harming Pratt was entirely gratuitous. Prodata could have
sued Pratt for violation of the noncompetition covenant if it indeed had thought that
Pratt had violated his contract and that Prodata had suffered some damage giving rise
to a valid cause of action. Prodata, for whatever reasons, did not do that. Instead,
it undertook to harm Pratt by virtue of a certain kind of personal leverage that it
apparently had with UDOT by inducing UDOT to fire Pratt. Infliction of gratuitous
harm of that sort ought not to be acceptable under the law.
When ROA contracted with Mollerup, ROA could have erected its sign at Mollerup's
northern boundary with no harm either to Garco or to ROA's economic prospects. Garco could
then have contracted for a lease at Garco's southern boundary. Instead, ROA carried out its earlier
threat to injure Garco, and chose a location just within 500 feet of Garco's southern boundary.
After ROA erected its Mollerup sign, it again told Garco, as it had threatened to nearly 3 years
earlier, that it chose the location for the sole purpose to prevent Garco from doing business.
After ROA removed its Garco sign, by letter dated August 9, 1995 ROA told Garco:
In regards to another matter, that being the possibility of locating an outdoor
advertising structure somewhere upon this location at a point to be determined in the

future, I would greatly appreciate you facilitating a meeting between myself and Joe
[Joe Kingston], as we seem to have a hard time connecting. I look forward to
facilitating a mutually beneficial business relationship in the near future ...
[R 254 (App. 4 Ex. 5 - depo Ex 21)]
The only way ROA and Garco could have "a mutually beneficial business relationship"
would be if ROA moved its Mollerup sign north so as not to violate the 500 foot spacing limit, and
then leased with Garco. ROA's letter shows ROA placed the Mollerup sign for the sole purpose
of forcing Garco to deal with ROA or no one. ROA's prior dealings showed ROA would not
negotiate in good faith, but would deal with Garco only on ROA's unilaterally imposed terms. A
trier of fact could certainly find "something akin to extortion in defendants' motivation," which the
Pratt court found was an improper purpose.
Garco need not negate every possible claim ROA was at least partially motivated by its own
economic interests. At least one purpose of ROA was to injure Garco. As in Pratt, ROA's purpose
to injure Garco needs only be a predominant purpose, not the exclusive or controlling purpose.
ROA's claim it had a legitimate economic purpose is an after-the-fact rationalization.
Locating the sign 20 feet one way or another would not have affected the value of the sign for
advertising. ROA's sign placement did nothing whatever to forestall competition or otherwise
promote ROA's long-term economic advantage. If that was ROA's real purpose, ROA could also
have contracted with Garco's neighbor to the south, and erected yet another income-producing sign.
ROA's competitors still can compete for a lease outside the 500 foot limit on the property of
Garco's neighbor to the south. The only thing ROA affected was Garco's ability to contract.
ROA's predominant purpose, and the only result, was to destroy an asset of Garco's - the value of
Garco's rental property. ROA only made it impossible, without moving its new sign, even for ROA
to contract with Garco for its own economic benefit, and so was not, in the trial court's words, for

a "long-range purpose of achieving some personal economic gain." As Justice Stewart remarked
in Pratt, infliction of gratuitous harm of that sort ought not to be acceptable under the law.
ROA's improper purpose is also evidenced by the manner in which it "moved" its Garco
sign. ROA did not move its sign; it erected a completely new one, then cut its Garco sign off and
left the foundation in place for Garco to deal with as best it could. The foundation ROA left behind
still has intrinsic economic value to ROA. InR.O.A. General, Inc. v. LynnD. Kitchener al, Civil
No. 940905728PR (Utah 3d Dist. Ct.) ROA testified its sign foundations were valuable and could
be reused; if it suited ROA's purpose, ROA would even sue to recover its foundations:
THE COURT: Mr. Reagan, does that foundation have any value other than hooking
to Mr. Rogers' ankle and throwing it?
MR. REAGAN: Yes, there is about 20 feet of steel pipe there. ... And we want
to use that steel pipe and that foundation to rebuild the other sign. ... We don't
want to destroy their sign. ... We just want to get our pipe, remove our foundation.
[R. 219 (App. 4, Ex. 1) - Testimony of Reagan, hearing transcript p. 55 lines 6-22, R.O.A.
General. Inc. v. Lynn D. Kitchen et al, Civil No. 940905728PR (Utah 3d Dist. Ct.)] If ROA had
a legitimate economic interest it would have furthered that interest by taking its entire sign including
the foundation. The fact it did not shows ROA had a predominant purpose to injure Garco.

B.

The Trial Court Erred in Ruling ROA Did Not Use Improper Means.
The trial court's finding there was no evidence of improper means is also erroneous. The

Utah Supreme Court has outlined what kind of conduct is an "improper means":
[I]mproper means is satisfied where the means used to interfere with a party's
economic relations are contrary to law, such as violations of statutes, regulations,
or recognized common-law rules. Such acts are illegal or tortious in themselves and
hence are clearly "improper" means of interference ...
Leigh Furniture at 311 (citations omitted).

A violation of law is an improper means. The Utah Outdoor Advertising Act provides: 6
U.C.A. §27-12-136.5(2)(a) Any sign allowed to be erected ... shall not be closer
than 500 feet to an existing off-premise sign adjacent to an interstate highway ...
U.C.A. §27-12-136.7(l)(a) Outdoor advertising may not be maintained without a
current permit.
(5)(a) Each sign shall have its permit continuously affixed to the sign ...
In addition, UDOT regulations promulgated under the Act provide:
R933-2-4 (1) All controlled outdoor advertising signs ... must have a permit.
(2)
Anyone preparing to erect a controlled sign shall apply for the permit before
beginning construction of the sign. ...
(3)
Permits may be issued only for signs already lawfully erected or to be lawfully
erected within 90 days from the date of the issuance of the permit. Within 30 days from the
date of issuance, the permit must be affixed to the completed sign for which the permit was
issued ...
(4)
A permit affixed to a sign other than the sign for which it was issued is unlawful ...
R933-2-5 (1) Sign changes or repairs, including those for signs in a commercial or
industrial zone, are subject to the following requirements:
(c)
A conforming sign may be ... relocated upon proper written request (R-407),
provided such change is in compliance with the Act and these rules. ...
ROA violated UDOT regulations in the process of erecting and permitting its Mollerup sign,
and thereby used improper means. ROA applied to move its Permit No. 2-0966 to a new sign to
be constructed on the Mollerup property. ROA completed construction of its new Mollerup sign by
June 1, 1995. ROA's Permit No. 2-0547 remained on the Garco sign until ROA cut the sign off
on June 19, 1995. ROA did not attach Permit No. 2-0966, the permit for the sign ROA had applied
to move, to the Mollerup sign. Instead, ROA later transferred Permit No. 2-0547 to the Mollerup
sign. The record is silent as to the present whereabouts of Permit No. 2-0966. What is known is
that Permit No. 2-0966 was never on the Garco sign or the Mollerup sign. (It is reasonable to infer
Permit No. 2-0966 is on some other ROA sign.)
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U.C.A. §27-12-136.5 and -136.7 have been renumbered as §72-7-505 and -507.

It would also be unlawful, and therefore an improper means, for ROA to interfere with
Garco's prospective economic relations by a trespass on Garco's property. The Utah Outdoor
Advertising Act precluded Garco from contracting for another sign as long as ROA's sign was on
Garco's property. ROA at first remained in possession by feigning an interest in a new lease.
Although it had no valid lease, ROA refused to remove its sign. ROA's choice for the Mollerup
sign location just within the 500 foot limit shows ROA's feigned interest in the Garco property was
a misrepresentation by which ROA intended to, and did, lull Garco into inaction. When that failed,
ROA stayed in trespass, and in unlawful detainer in violation of U.C. A. §78-36-3(1). ROA's acts
prevented Garco being able to apply for a sign permit during the period while ROA was applying
to move its Permit No. 2-0966 to the Mollerup sign. ROA then illegally erected a sign less than
400 feet from its still-existing Garco sign. ROA's violation of statutes, misrepresentations to Garco,
and violation of the recognized common-law rules governing trespass, all constitute intentional
interference by improper means.
ROA's act was a calculated anticompetitive injury to the market.

Contrary to being

"legitimate competitive activity," it is forbidden by the Utah Antitrust Act. U.C.A. §76-10-914(1)
provides, "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint
of trade or commerce is declared to be illegal." An agreement (as between ROA and Mollerup) to
forestall competitive activity is a contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade. The trial
court's finding of no improper means is contrary to its finding that ROA placed its sign on the
Mollerup property for the express purpose of "forestalling competitive activity." Under sections
76-10-918 and -919 such a contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade subjects a
corporate violator to substantial penalties. The very findings from which the trial court concluded
there was no improper purpose support a finding of improper means.

IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING GARCO'S CLAIM FOR
PUNITIVE DAMAGES.
Garco's claim for punitive damages was dismissed on the sole grounds the trial court

dismissed the underlying tort claims. Because the dismissal of those claims was erroneous,
dismissal of Garco's punitive damages claim was similarly in error.

V.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN STRIKING PORTIONS OF GARCO'S
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ITS RULE 54(b) MOTION.

A.

The Trial Court Erred in Striking Arguments It Considered on the Merits.
In its April 8, 1998 Minute Entry, the trial court ruled:
1)
Plaintiffs motion to revise is denied. Motions to reconsider are not favored.
None of plaintiffs arguments persuade the Court that its original ruling was not
proper. On the contrary, plaintiffs arguments essentially rehash arguments already
fully considered.
2)
Defendant's motion to strike is granted, as limited in defendant's reply
memorandum. The Court believes State vs. Phathammavong, 860 P.2d 1001,
(1993), sets forth the principles of law governing plaintiff's reply memorandum. It
is persuaded the many points in plaintiffs reply memorandum not previously raised
are properly stricken as defendant urges.
3)
Defendant is requested to prepare an Order consistent with the Court's ruling.

Counsel for Defendant then prepared an Order which provided in full, without any findings or
conclusions:
1.
Defendant's Motion to Strike Points "B," "D," "E," "F," and "11" of Garco's
Reply Memo is granted.
2.
Plaintiffs Motion to Revise Order and Judgment Dismissing Plaintiff's
Complaint is denied.
Paragraph 1 of the Memorandum Decision shows the trial court considered all of Garco's
arguments in denying Garco's Motion to Revise. The trial court could only have ruled "None of
plaintiff's arguments persuade the Court that its original ruling was not proper" by considering those

arguments. Garco is entitled to have them reviewed by this Court. For the trial court to consider
Garco's arguments on the merits for purposes of deciding the Motion, then to strike those arguments
for purposes of appeal, was an abuse of discretion. This is particularly true where as here the trial
court directed ROA "to prepare an Order consistent with the Court's ruling," and then entered an
Order prepared by ROA that did not accurately reflect the ruling as shown by the minute entry.

B.

The Stricken Arguments Were Proper Rebuttal.
The arguments Garco raised in its motion to revise were appropriate. Rule 54(b) allows a

court to revise non-final decisions for any legitimate reason. See Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d
1178, 1184 (Utah 1993) ("We hold that pursuant to the provisions of rule 54(b), because the
summary judgment was "subject to revision," a motion to reconsider is a reasonable means of
requesting such a revision and is therefore permitted."). In Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884
P.2d 1306, 1311 (Utah App. 1994) this Court noted:
A court can consider several factors in determining the propriety of reconsidering
a prior ruling. These may include, but are not limited to, when (1) the matter is
presented in a "different light" or under "different circumstances;" (2) there has
been a change in the governing law; (3) a party offers new evidence; (4) "manifest
injustice" will result if the court does not reconsider the prior ruling; (5) a court
needs to correct its own errors; or (6) an issue was inadequately briefed when first
contemplated by the court.
Although Garco had requested a hearing on its cross motion for summary judgment, when
dismissing the Complaint the trial court had not read Garco's cross motion memorandum or
affidavits. Garco's motion, and the its subsequent motion to revise, presented the case in a different
light, presented new evidence, more fully briefed issues raised earlier, and showed why the trial
court should have corrected its own errors to avoid injustice. Garco had the right in its reply
memorandum to rebut matters raised in ROA's memorandum the motion to revise. ROA had

